 Hub-and-Spoke Regulation and Bank Leverage*Inconsistent regulators: evidence from bankingYadav Gopalan, Ankit Kalda and Asaf Manela Review of Finance, 2021, vol. 25, issue 5, 1499-1545 Abstract: Regulators often delegate monitoring to local supervisors, which can improve information collection, but can also lead to agency problems and capture. We document that following the closure of a US bank regulator’s field offices, the banks they previously supervised actively increased their risk of failure by distributing cash, increasing leverage, and lending more than similar banks at the same time and place. Supervisor proximity is a channel through which these effects operate. Our findings suggest that local supervision is an important part of regulation, as it facilitates collection of information imperfectly reflected in reported measures, and that switching from onsite to offsite supervision can increase bank risk. Keywords: Financial regulation; Bank supervision; Delegated monitoring; Offsite examinations (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:revfin:v:25:y:2021:i:5:p:1499-1545. Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Review of Finance is currently edited by Marcin Kacperczyk More articles in Review of Finance from European Finance Association Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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