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Advertising Arbitrage

Synchronization risk and delayed arbitrage

Sergey Kovbasyuk and Marco Pagano

Review of Finance, 2022, vol. 26, issue 4, 799-827

Abstract: An arbitrageur with short investment horizon gains from accelerating price discovery by advertising his private information. However, advertising many assets may overload investors’ attention, reducing the number of informed traders per asset, and slowing price discovery. So the arbitrageur optimally concentrates advertising on just a few assets, unless his trades have significant price impact. The arbitrageur’s gain from advertising is increasing in the assets’ mispricing and in the precision of his private information, and is decreasing in its complexity. If several arbitrageurs have private information, inefficient equilibria can arise, where substantial mispricing persists or investors’ attention is overloaded.

Keywords: Limits to arbitrage; Advertising; Price discovery; Limited attention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D84 G11 G14 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Advertising Arbitrage (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Advertising Arbitrage (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Advertising Arbitrage (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Advertising Arbitrage (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Advertising Arbitrage (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Advertising arbitrage (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Advertising arbitrage (2014) Downloads
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