Firms and Local Governments: Relationship Building during Political Turnovers*
Hanming Fang,
Zhe Li,
Nianhang Xu and
Hongjun Yan
Review of Finance, 2023, vol. 27, issue 2, 739-762
Abstract:
We study how firms build relations with local governments in emerging markets without established rules of political lobbying. We document that following a turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially privately owned enterprises, POEs hereafter) headquartered in that city significantly increase their “perk spending,” for example, expenses for travel and entertainment among others. Both the instrumental-variable-based results and heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with local governments. In addition, we find that local political turnover in a city tends to be followed by changes of the Chairmen or the CEOs of state-owned enterprises that are controlled by the local government. We also discuss and rule out several alternative explanations for the above findings.
Keywords: Government; Relationship; Political turnovers; Perk; Personnel changes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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