EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Asymmetric Information and Corporate Lending: Evidence from SME Bond Markets*

Alessandra Iannamorelli, Stefano Nobili, Antonio Scalia and Luana Zaccaria

Review of Finance, 2024, vol. 28, issue 1, 163-201

Abstract: Using a comprehensive dataset of Italian small and medium-sized enterprises, we find that differences between private and public information on firm creditworthiness affect the decision to issue bonds. Our evidence supports favorable (rather than adverse) selection in corporate bond markets. Specifically, holding public information constant, firms with better private fundamentals are more likely to access bond markets. These effects are weaker for opaque firms and stronger for firms with worse publicly observable risk. Additionally, credit conditions improve for issuers following the bond placement, compared with a matched sample of non-issuers. This is consistent with a model where banks offer more flexibility than markets during financial distress and firms use market lending to signal credit quality to outside stakeholders.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Bank credit; Bond markets; SME finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfad024 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetric Information and Corporate Lending: Evidence from SMEs Bond Markets (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Asymmetric information in corporate lending: evidence from SME bond markets (2020) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:revfin:v:28:y:2024:i:1:p:163-201.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Finance is currently edited by Marcin Kacperczyk

More articles in Review of Finance from European Finance Association Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:28:y:2024:i:1:p:163-201.