Trust and delegated investing: a Money Doctors experiment

Maximilian Germann, Lukas Mertes, Martin Weber and Benjamin Loos

Review of Finance, 2025, vol. 29, issue 1, 75-102

Abstract: The more trust investors place in a money manager, the more confident they are to take risk. We test this theory in a laboratory experiment using the amount returned from a trust game as measure of trustworthiness. Investors increase the share invested in risky assets with high-cost money managers compared to those with low costs when the high-cost money managers are more trustworthy than the low-cost ones. The willingness to take more risk with high-cost money managers is increasing in the difference in trustworthiness. Up to a third of the difference in trustworthiness translates into an increasing risky share. Vice versa, investors are willing to accept higher costs for investments made through more trustworthy money managers. Our findings are robust to alternative explanations, demonstrating that the risk-aversion channel can be sufficient for trust to influence behavior.

Keywords: Financial Advice; Investment Decisions; Trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D14 G11 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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