Seasoned Equity Issues in a Closely Held Market: Evidence from France

Jean-François Gajewski and Edith Ginglinger

Review of Finance, 2002, vol. 6, issue 3, 291-319

Abstract: This paper examines seasoned equity offerings in France. Even though a rights offering is the primary flotation method, French companies are increasingly using the relatively expensive public offering method. We show that the market reaction to the announcement of seasoned equity issues is significantly negative for rights issues and insignificantly negative for public offerings. Our results suggest that the adverse selection effect is greater for rights issues than for public offerings, due to stronger underwriter certification for the public offerings. We find that the share price effect is positively related to blockholders take-up renouncements for firms with prior concentrated ownership. For these firms, the favourable ownership dispersion effect offsets the adverse selection effect. JEL Classification: G32, G14 and D80.

Date: 2002
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