Enhancing Bank Transparency: A Re-assessment

Ari Hyytinen and Tuomas Takalo

Review of Finance, 2002, vol. 6, issue 3, 429-445

Abstract: Transparency regulation aims at reducing financial fragility by strengthening market discipline. There are, however, two elementary properties of banking that may render such regulation inefficient at best and detrimental at worst. First, an extensive financial safety net may eliminate the disciplinary effect of transparency regulation. Second, achieving transparency is costly for banks, as it dilutes their charter values, and hence also reduces their private costs of risk-taking. We consider both the direct costs of complying with disclosure requirements and the indirect transparency costs stemming from imperfect property rights governing information and particularly infer the conditions under which transparency regulation cannot reduce financial fragility. JEL classification codes: G21, G28

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Enchancing Bank Transparency: A Re-assessment (2002)
Working Paper: Enhancing Bank Transparency: a Re-assessment (2000)
Working Paper: Enhancing bank transparency: A re-assessment (2000)
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