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Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design

Rafael Repullo and Javier Suarez

The Review of Financial Studies, 1998, vol. 11, issue 1, 163-87

Abstract: By identifying the possibility of imposing a credible threat of liquidation as the key role of informed (bank) finance in a moral hazard context, we characterize the circumstances under which a mixture of informed and uninformed (market) finance is optimal, and explain why bank debt is typically secured, senior, and tightly held. We also show that the effectiveness of mixed finance may be impaired by the possibility of collusion between the firms and their informed lenders, and that in the optimal renegotiation-proof contract informed debt capacity will be exhausted before appealing to supplementary uninformed finance. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Date: 1998
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Related works:
Working Paper: Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design (1996)
Working Paper: Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design (1995)
Working Paper: Monitoring,Liquidation,and Security Design (1995)
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The Review of Financial Studies is currently edited by Itay Goldstein

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