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A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation

Kose John, Anthony Saunders and Lemma W Senbet

The Review of Financial Studies, 2000, vol. 13, issue 1, 95-125

Abstract: We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios may be ineffective in controlling risk taking. We propose, instead, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation. With this scheme, we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure that induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank's management. We explicitly characterize the parameters of the optimal management compensation structure and the fairly priced FDIC insurance premium in the presence of a single or multiple sources of agency problems. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Date: 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation (1998)
Working Paper: A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation (1996)
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The Review of Financial Studies is currently edited by Itay Goldstein

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