Do Retail Incentives Work in Privatizations?

Matti Keloharju, Samuli Knüpfer and Sami Torstila

The Review of Financial Studies, 2008, vol. 21, issue 5, 2061-2095

Abstract: Twenty countries around the world have used $27 billion in incentives such as bonus shares and discounts to attract retail investors to participate in privatizations and to discourage them from flipping their shares. Our results show that incentives have performed well, increasing retail investor participation much more cost effectively than underpricing. Flipping is not only much reduced in the short term but remains cumulatively at least 15% lower after 1000 trading days. The expiration of bonus share plans is associated with a 6-day abnormal return of -1.0% and a long-term increase in trading volume. , Oxford University Press.

Date: 2008
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