Bank Debt and Corporate Governance

Victoria Ivashina, Vinay Nair, Anthony Saunders, Nadia Massoud and Roger Stover

The Review of Financial Studies, 2009, vol. 22, issue 1, 41-77

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the disciplining role of banks and bank debt in the market for corporate control. We find that relationship bank lending intensity and bank client network have positive effects on the probability of a borrowing firm becoming a target. This effect is enhanced in cases where the target and acquirer have a relationship with the same bank. Moreover, we utilize an experiment to show that the effects of relationship bank lending intensity on takeover probability are not driven by endogeneity. Finally, we also investigate reasons motivating a bank's informational role in the market for corporate control. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2009
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