Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

David Martinez-Miera and Rafael Repullo

The Review of Financial Studies, 2010, vol. 23, issue 10, 3638-3664

Abstract: A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that lower rates also reduce the banks' revenues from performing loans. This paper shows that when this effect is taken into account, a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.

Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure? (2008)
Working Paper: Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure? (2008)
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