Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model
Keiichi Hori () and
Review of Financial Studies, 2013, vol. 26, issue 10, 2620-2647
We explore a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist (VC)--entrepreneur relationship where the VC both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering (IPO), we show that optimal IPO timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Our results also indicate that the manager's compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard. We derive several comparative static results, notably that IPO timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the VC is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org., Oxford University Press.
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