Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector

Viral Acharya and Raghuram Rajan

The Review of Financial Studies, 2013, vol. 26, issue 6, 1526-1560

Abstract: What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? We develop a model where myopic governments seek popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when debt is low because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default as debt builds up and net new borrowing becomes difficult, because of the adverse consequences from default to the domestic financial sector. More myopic governments default less often, but tax in a more distortionary way and increase the vulnerability of the domestic financial sector to future government debt default. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Sovereign debt, government myopia, and the financial sector (2011)
Working Paper: Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector (2011)
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