The Euro Interbank Repo Market

Loriano Mancini, Angelo Ranaldo and Jan Wrampelmeyer

The Review of Financial Studies, 2016, vol. 29, issue 7, 1747-1779

Abstract: The search for a market design that ensures stable bank funding is at the top of regulators' policy agenda. This paper empirically shows that the central counterparty (CCP)-based euro interbank repo market features this stability. Using a unique and comprehensive data set, we show that the market is resilient during crisis episodes and may even act as a shock absorber, in the sense that repo lending increases with risk, while spreads, maturities, and haircuts remain stable. Our comparison across different repo markets shows that anonymous CCP-based trading, safe collateral, and the absence of an unwind mechanism are the key characteristics to ensure market resilience. Received October 22, 2014; accepted July 28, 2015 by Editor Stefan Nagel.

Date: 2016
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