Financing from Family and Friends

Samuel Lee and Petra Persson

The Review of Financial Studies, 2016, vol. 29, issue 9, 2341-2386

Abstract: Most informal finance comes from family and friends. Existing informal finance theories cannot match two characteristics of family finance: family investors may accept below-market or even negative returns, yet borrowers often prefer formal finance. We argue that social preferences make family finance cheap but create shadow costs that nonetheless discourage its use: Committing family funds to risky investment displaces intrafamily insurance and undermines limited liability. The same characteristics that sustain familial insurance thus render family finance a poor source of risk capital. Even when overcoming capital constraints requires social ties, intermediation and semiformalization may therefore be crucial for promoting risk taking. Received April 29, 2013; accepted December 4, 2015 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Financing from Family and Friends (2012)
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