Rational Opacity

Cyril Monnet and Erwan Quintin ()

The Review of Financial Studies, 2017, vol. 30, issue 12, 4317-4348

Abstract: We present an environment in which long-term investors sometimes choose to restrict how much fundamental information they receive about the value of their investment to preserve its liquidity in secondary markets. When and only when there is a risk that secondary markets may be shallow, more information can reduce the expected payoff of agents who need to cash out early. Even given direct and costless control over information design, stakeholders choose to incentivize managers to withhold interim information. In such an environment, imposing transparency can lower investment and welfare. Received October 17, 2014; editorial decision January 21, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Date: 2017
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The Review of Financial Studies is currently edited by Itay Goldstein

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