EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Agency Conflicts around the World

Erwan Morellec, Boris Nikolov and Norman Schürhoff
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Norman Schuerhoff

The Review of Financial Studies, 2018, vol. 31, issue 11, 4232-4287

Abstract: We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large and highly variable across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than for guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally between wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions. Recent governance reforms in Europe have significantly reduced agency costs.Received April 19, 2016; editorial decision November 18, 2017 by Received April 19, 2016; editorial decision November 18, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhy018 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Agency Conflicts Around the World (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Agency Conflicts Around the World (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Agency Conflicts Around the World (2016) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:11:p:4232-4287.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Financial Studies is currently edited by Itay Goldstein

More articles in The Review of Financial Studies from Society for Financial Studies Oxford University Press, Journals Department, 2001 Evans Road, Cary, NC 27513 USA.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:11:p:4232-4287.