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Safe Haven CDS Premiums

Sven Klingler and David Lando

The Review of Financial Studies, 2018, vol. 31, issue 5, 1856-1895

Abstract: Credit default swaps can be used to lower the capital requirements of dealer banks entering into uncollateralized derivatives positions with sovereigns. We show in a model that the regulatory incentive to obtain capital relief makes CDS contracts valuable to dealer banks and empirically that, consistent with the use of CDS for regulatory purposes, there is a disconnect between changes in bond yield spreads and in CDS premiums, especially for safe sovereigns. Additional empirical tests related to the volume of contracts outstanding, effects of regulatory proxies, and the corporate bond and CDS markets support that CDS contracts are used for capital relief. Received September 28, 2016; editorial decision January 26, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online

Date: 2018
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The Review of Financial Studies is currently edited by Itay Goldstein

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