Public Oversight and Reporting Credibility: Evidence from the PCAOB Audit Inspection Regime
Brandon Gipper,
Christian Leuz and
Mark Maffett
The Review of Financial Studies, 2020, vol. 33, issue 10, 4532-4579
Abstract:
This paper studies the impact of public audit oversight on financial reporting credibility. We analyze changes in market responses to earnings news after public audit oversight is introduced, exploiting that the regime onset depends on fiscal year-ends, auditors, and the rollout of auditor inspections. We find that investors respond more strongly to earnings news following public audit oversight. Corroborating these findings, we find an increase in volume responses to 10-K filings after the new regime. Our results show that public audit oversight can enhance reporting credibility and that this credibility is priced in capital markets.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford UniversityPress Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
JEL-codes: G14 G38 K22 M41 M42 M48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)
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