Countercyclical Bank Equity Issuance

Matthew Baron and Itay Goldstein

The Review of Financial Studies, 2020, vol. 33, issue 9, 4186-4230

Abstract: Over the period 1980–2012, large U.S. commercial banks raise and retain less equity during credit expansions, which amplifies their leverage. The decrease in equity issuance is large relative to subsequent banking losses. I consider a variety of explanations for why banks resist raising equity and find evidence consistent with the diminishment of creditor market discipline due to government guarantees. I test this explanation by analyzing the removal of government guarantees to German Landesbank creditors and find that creditor market discipline and equity issuance increase. These findings help explain why banks resist raising equity, making financial distress more likely.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

JEL-codes: G21 G28 G32 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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