Paying by Donating: Corporate Donations Affiliated with Independent Directors

Corporate political donations: Investment or agency?

Ye Cai, Jin Xu and Jun Yang

The Review of Financial Studies, 2021, vol. 34, issue 2, 618-660

Abstract: Corporate donations to charities affiliated with the board’s independent directors (affiliated donations) are large and mostly undetected due to lack of formal disclosure. Affiliated donations may impair independent directors’ monitoring incentives. CEO compensation is on average 9.4% higher at firms making affiliated donations than at other firms, and it is much higher when the compensation committee chair or a large fraction of compensation committee members are involved. We find suggestive evidence that CEOs are unlikely to be replaced for poor performance when firms donate to charities affiliated with a large fraction of the board or when they donate large amounts.

JEL-codes: G34 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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