When Shareholders Disagree: Trading after Shareholder Meetings

Sophia Zhengzi Li, Ernst Maug and Miriam Schwartz-Ziv

The Review of Financial Studies, 2022, vol. 35, issue 4, 1813-1867

Abstract: This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks on the meeting date, and remains high up to four weeks after shareholder meetings. The results support models based on differences of opinion that predict that shareholders’ beliefs may diverge more after observing voting outcomes. Hence, trading after meetings creates a more homogeneous shareholder base, which has important implications for corporate governance.

JEL-codes: G11 G12 G14 G30 G40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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