The Oligopoly Lucas Tree
Winston Dou,
Yan Ji and
Wei Wu
The Review of Financial Studies, 2022, vol. 35, issue 8, 3867-3921
Abstract:
This paper proposes a novel quantitative framework with endogenous strategic competition in heterogeneous concentrated industries. Oligopolies compete strategically for profit margins in repeated games, trading off the benefits of future cooperation against those of reaping higher short-run profits by undercutting their rivals. Cross-industry dispersions in market leadership persistence and cash flow loadings on expected growth, as primitive characteristics, simultaneously determine the relationships among profitability, book-to-market ratios, and systematic risk exposures, thereby quantitatively rationalizing the gross profitability and value premium across industries and, importantly, their interactions. Controlling for the book-to-market ratio (gross profitability) makes the gross profitability (value) premium more pronounced.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
JEL-codes: C73 G12 L13 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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