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Shareholder Monitoring through Voting: New Evidence from Proxy Contests

Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li and James Pinnington

The Review of Financial Studies, 2024, vol. 37, issue 2, 591-638

Abstract: We present the first comprehensive study of mutual fund voting in proxy contests. Among contests where voting takes place, passive funds are 10 percentage points less likely than active funds to vote for dissidents. The gap shrinks significantly when accounting for votes withheld from management nominees, settled contests, and votes by non-“Big-Three” fund families. Passive and active funds are equally informed about firm fundamentals, although passive funds view contest-related SEC filings more often than active funds during contests, in absolute levels and incrementally relative to noncontest periods. We conclude that passive funds are engaged shareholders in high-stakes voting events.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online

Keywords: G320; G340; G380 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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The Review of Financial Studies is currently edited by Itay Goldstein

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