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Does It Pay to Do Novel Science? The Selectivity Patterns in Science Funding

Charles Ayoubi, Michele Pezzoni and Fabiana Visentin

Science and Public Policy, 2021, vol. 48, issue 5, 635-648

Abstract: Public funding agencies aim to fund novel breakthrough research to promote the radical scientific discoveries of tomorrow. Identifying the profiles of scientists being financed to pursue their research is therefore crucial. This paper shows that the funding process is not always awarding the most novel scientists. Exploiting rich data on all applications to a leading Swiss research funding program, we find that novel scientists have a higher probability of applying for funds than non-novel scientists, but they get on average lower ratings by grant evaluators and have fewer chances of being funded. We discuss the implications for the allocation of scientific research spending.

Keywords: public funding; scientific research; novelty; selectivity; research evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Does it Pay to Do Novel Science? The Selectivity Patterns in Science Funding (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Does it pay to do novel science? The selectivity patterns in science funding (2019) Downloads
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