Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? Evidence from Tunisia

Bob Rijkersb, Hassen Arouri and Leila Baghdadi

The World Bank Economic Review, 2017, vol. 30, issue Supplement_1, S166-S175

Abstract: Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper demonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evade taxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6% more likely not to submit a tax declaration in spite of registering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4% more likely to report anomalously low sales when submitting a tax declaration.

JEL-codes: D22 E26 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/wber/lhw018 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:wbecrv:v:30:y:2017:i:supplement_1:p:s166-s175.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The World Bank Economic Review is currently edited by Eric Edmonds and Nina Pavcnik

More articles in The World Bank Economic Review from World Bank Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().