Unitary or Noncooperative Intrahousehold Model? Evidence from Couples in Uganda

Nathan Fiala and Xi He

The World Bank Economic Review, 2017, vol. 30, issue Supplement_1, S77-S85

Abstract: We present an overview of the evidence regarding the unitary, collective and non-cooperative models of household decision making and discuss how they can affect individual and household welfare. We then discuss the results of an artefactual experiment conducted in Uganda with spouses in order to test whether household members maximize common preferences, or instead are willing to pay a significant cost to hide money from their spouse. We find that both the unitary and non-cooperative models exist in the intra-household decision making process and that a “one-size fits all” model of household decision making is unlikely to be satisfactory.

JEL-codes: D13 J12 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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