Does Greater Regulatory Burden Lead to More Corruption? Evidence Using Firm-Level Survey Data for Developing Countries

Mohammad Amin and Yew Chong Soh

The World Bank Economic Review, 2021, vol. 35, issue 3, 812-828

Abstract: It is sometimes thought that regulation often creates opportunities for public officials to extract bribes. If this is true, deregulation offers a simple way of combating corruption. However, empirical evidence on the corruption and regulation nexus is limited. Further, the corruption indices used are based on experts’ opinions, which may suffer from perception bias. The present paper attempts to address these shortcomings using firm-level survey data for 131 mostly developing countries on the actual experience of the firms with bribery and regulatory burden. The study examines the level of overall corruption and petty corruption. Exploiting variation in regulatory burden, both within-country and industry-level, a large positive effect of regulatory burden on corruption is found. For the baseline results, the bribery rate is higher by about 0.03 percentage points for each percentage point increase in the regulatory burden. The finding is robust to several controls and endogeneity checks.

Keywords: corruption; regulation; firm level; bribery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/wber/lhaa007 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:wbecrv:v:35:y:2021:i:3:p:812-828.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The World Bank Economic Review is currently edited by Eric Edmonds and Nina Pavcnik

More articles in The World Bank Economic Review from World Bank Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().