Theoretical Implications of Imperfect Competition on Quota License Prices and Auctions

Kala Krishna ()

The World Bank Economic Review, 1993, vol. 7, issue 1, 113-36

Abstract: This article looks at the implications for trade policy of recent work on quota auctions. Recent work has considered a variety of market structures in addition to the standard one of monopoly in the product market. It has also emphasized details of the implementation process, as well as the timing of decisions and dynamic factors. Such considerations are shown to be important, because they can greatly affect the outcome of trade policies. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1993
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