The Impact of Fiscal Competition about International Double Taxation in a Nash Equilibrium Point of View

Trandafir Adina ()
Additional contact information
Trandafir Adina: „Spiru Haret” University

Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, 2010, vol. X, issue 2, 797-802

Abstract: This paper examines international tax rules, with respect to both corporate income tax rates and tax rules for double taxation. This article assumes that governments set non-discriminatory tax rates on domesticand foreign-sourced corporate income and can choose no tax allowance as the tax rule. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium outcomes contradict the intuition underlying previous studies: no tax allowance is chosen as the tax rule where world economic welfare can be maximized. The purpose of this paper is to examine the strategic impact of the tax policies of capital-importing and capitalexporting countries on international investment income.

Keywords: fiscal rules; double taxation; tax rate; capital-exporting/importing country (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H H2 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://stec.univ-ovidius.ro/html/anale/RO/cuprins%20rezumate/rezumate2010p2.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ovi:oviste:v:10:y:2010:i:2:p:797-802

Access Statistics for this article

Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series is currently edited by Spatariu Cerasela

More articles in Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series from Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gheorghiu Gabriela ().