Increasing Firm's Competences through Evolutionary Games

Nicoleta Sirghi and Neamtu Mihaela ()
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Neamtu Mihaela: West University of Timisoara

Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, 2012, vol. XII, issue 2, 519-524

Abstract: The firms have different behaviors on the real market. Starting from these ideas the present paper intends to identify the main explanatory elements that show the evolution of the firm. We study the effect of time delays in evolutionary games with one population of users and two strategies. The case where the delays, corresponding to different strategies, are not the same is considered. The local stability of the stationary state for the replicator dynamics is analyzed. The stochastic evolutionary game with delay is taken into consideration. The last part of the paper includes numerical simulations and conclusions.

Keywords: dynamics games; evolutionary games; equilibrium conditions; stability conditions; delayed differential evolutionary games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C62 C73 D00 D58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ovi:oviste:v:xii:y:2012:i:2:p:519-524

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