Solving agency problems in Chinese family firms – A law and finance perspective
Jing Zhou (),
On Kit Tam () and
Wei Lan ()
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Jing Zhou: School of International Business, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
On Kit Tam: Business College, RMIT University
Wei Lan: Statistical School and Center of Statistical Research, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Asian Business & Management, 2016, vol. 15, issue 1, 57-82
Abstract To overcome the potential for omitted-variable and aggregation biases in country-based comparisons commonly adopted in the law and finance literature, this study designs a within-country analysis of legal measures toward resolving agency problems in Chinese family firms. Our findings show that agency costs in family firms can be significantly minimized by the evolution of formal legal rules, even with weak enforcement of investor protection. These results have important implications for economic reform and corporate development in emerging economies, because they show that the development of rules and regulations does matter in countries with weak enforcement.
Keywords: agency problems; family firms; law and finance; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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