The Depoliticization of Monetary Policy
Jerry Tempelman
Business Economics, 2008, vol. 43, issue 2, 16-22
Abstract:
In the past thirty years, it has been claimed that Republicans tend to favor relatively restrictive monetary policy while Democrats favor relatively accommodative monetary policy. Another claim is that, regardless of which political party is in power, monetary policy tends to be relatively restrictive during the first two years of an administration and relatively accommodative during its final two years. The present paper finds an absence of empirical evidence supporting either claim by restricting the sample period to the past quarter century (1982–2006). The depoliticization of monetary policy decisions probably reflects, among other factors, both the post-1970s new-Keynesian consensus in macroeconomic theory and the realization of political independence of the Federal Reserve System during the Volcker-Greenspan years.Business Economics (2008) 43, 16–22; doi:10.2145/20080202
Date: 2008
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