Financial Crises and Central Bank Independence

Alan Blinder

Business Economics, 2013, vol. 48, issue 3, 163-165

Abstract: Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility.

Date: 2013
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