Sovereign Debt Restructuring After Argentina

Arturo Porzecanski ()

Development, 2016, vol. 59, issue 1, 100-106

Abstract: Abstract Sovereign debt restructurings may experience marginal changes as a result of recent modifications in contractual terms being incorporated into new bond issues, but for the most part they will likely resemble what has generally worked so well in recent decades to the satisfaction of most governments and private creditors. The statutory reforms that have been proposed to date are highly unlikely to gain traction for a variety of reasons, including the prospect that they would have been stymied when confronted with a rogue sovereign debtor such as Argentina.

Keywords: Default; Statutory; Contractual; Collective action; Pari passu; Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1057/s41301-017-0067-z

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