Sovereign Debt Restructuring After Argentina

Arturo Porzecanski ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Sovereign debt restructurings may experience marginal changes as a result of recent modifications in contractual terms being incorporated into new bond issues, but for the most part they will likely resemble what has generally worked so well in recent decades to the satisfaction of most governments and private creditors. The statutory reforms that have been proposed to date are highly unlikely to gain traction for a variety of reasons, including the prospect that they would have been stymied when confronted with a rogue sovereign debtor such as Argentina.

Keywords: Argentina, default, debt, sovereign, restructuring, statutory; contractual; collective action; pari passu; finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 F3 F34 F51 F65 H63 K4 N26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/73361/1/MPRA_paper_73361.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79130/1/MPRA_paper_79130.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sovereign Debt Restructuring After Argentina (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:73361

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