Kantian Ethics and the Prisoners' Dilemma

Mark White ()

Eastern Economic Journal, 2009, vol. 35, issue 2, 137-143

Abstract: The prisoners' dilemma game stands as a seminal case of the conflict between individual and collective rationality. Some scholars have suggested that Kantian duty-based ethics can prevent the suboptimal outcomes associated with the game. I argue that this claim is too strong, because Kant's moral theory does not entail specific duties requiring cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games. I support this argument in terms of Kant's categorical imperative, and also with reference to his distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Eastern Economic Journal (2009) 35, 137–143. doi:10.1057/eej.2008.20

Date: 2009
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