The Complexity of Coordination
Davoud Taghawi-Nejad () and
Vipin P. Veetil ()
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Vipin P. Veetil: George Mason University
Eastern Economic Journal, 2017, vol. 43, issue 2, 260-270
Abstract The traditional mechanism of finding Nash equilibria presumes economic actors are capable of performing computations that even computers would take far too long to complete. A decentralized and parallel process of interactions between simple economic actors is presented as a more plausible microfoundation of the concept of Nash equilibria. It is found that agent interactions on a scale-free network converge to an equilibrium within reasonable time. NP computational complexity of Nash equilibria does not diminish its empirical relevance.
Keywords: coordination; emergence; complexity; interaction; network; C63; C72; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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