The Complexity of Coordination

Davoud Taghawi-Nejad () and Vipin P. Veetil ()
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Vipin P. Veetil: George Mason University

Eastern Economic Journal, 2017, vol. 43, issue 2, No 5, 260-270

Abstract: Abstract The traditional mechanism of finding Nash equilibria presumes economic actors are capable of performing computations that even computers would take far too long to complete. A decentralized and parallel process of interactions between simple economic actors is presented as a more plausible microfoundation of the concept of Nash equilibria. It is found that agent interactions on a scale-free network converge to an equilibrium within reasonable time. NP computational complexity of Nash equilibria does not diminish its empirical relevance.

Keywords: coordination; emergence; complexity; interaction; network; C63; C72; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1057/s41302-016-0012-y

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