Product Price and Advice Quality: Implications of the Commission System in Life Assurance

Hugh Gravelle

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 1993, vol. 18, issue 1, 53 pages

Abstract: The paper examines the implications of the commission system for the price of life assurance products and the quality of advice provided by brokers. The competitive equilibrium is shown to be neither first best nor second best efficient. The sources of the inefficiencies are examined and the effects of policy measures considered. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1993) 18, 31–53. doi:10.1007/BF01125817

Date: 1993
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Working Paper: Product Price and Advice Quality: Implications of the Commission System in Life Assurance (1991)
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