Does Health Insurance Lead to Ex ante Moral Hazard? Evidence from China’s New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme

Xuezheng Qin () and Tianyi Lu
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Tianyi Lu: School of Economics, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 2014, vol. 39, issue 4, 625-650

Abstract: This paper examines whether participating in the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS), a publicly subsidised health insurance programme in rural China, encourages individuals to engage in risky health behaviours. Despite its rapidly increasing coverage rate, relatively little attention has been paid to the impact of NRCMS on the lifestyle choices of its enrollees. On the basis of the 2000–2009 longitudinal data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), we find that NRCMS participation has a statistically significant (although quantitatively small) impact on people’s tendency towards smoking, heavy drinking (among males), spending time in sedentary activities, consuming high-calorie food and being overweight. The increase in these unhealthy lifestyles in turn leads to elevated disease risks, indicating that insurance-induced, “ex ante moral hazard” is present in rural China. The findings are robust to the variation in model specification and sample selection, as well as to the introduction of an instrumental variable that controls the endogeneity of insurance participation. Our results provide implications on reforming the pricing and administration practice of China’s largest health insurance campaign and on evaluating public insurance schemes in other developing countries.

Date: 2014
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