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Country Insurance

Tito Cordella () and Eduardo Levy Yeyati ()

IMF Staff Papers, 2005, vol. 52, issue si, 6

Abstract: In this paper, we examine how country insurance schemes affect policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: "buffering" reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, "enhancing" reforms that pay more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted. Copyright 2005, International Monetary Fund

JEL-codes: F30 G22 H50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Country Insurance (2004)
Working Paper: Country Insurance (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Country Insurance (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Country Insurance (2004) Downloads
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