EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Country Insurance

Tito Cordella () and Eduardo Levy Yeyati ()

Business School Working Papers from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Abstract: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. In this paper, we examine how the presence of country insurance schemes affects policymakers’ incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: “buffering” reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, “enhancing” reforms that pay off more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.utdt.edu/departamentos/empresarial/cif/pdfs-wp/wpcif-102004.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Country Insurance (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Country Insurance (2004)
Working Paper: Country Insurance (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Country Insurance (2004) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:countryinsurance

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Business School Working Papers from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nicolás Del Ponte ().

 
Page updated 2022-09-23
Handle: RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:countryinsurance