How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated?Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence

Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh

IMF Staff Papers, 2006, vol. 53, issue 3, 4

Abstract: Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 43 countries over the period 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends on other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality of fiscal reporting. Copyright 2006, International Monetary Fund

JEL-codes: H74 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2006/04/pdf/plekhano.pdf main text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated? Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:53:y:2006:i:3:p:4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/41308/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in IMF Staff Papers from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().