Income Distribution And Rent Seeking Costs: A Note

Maria Alessandra Antonelli ()
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Maria Alessandra Antonelli: “La Sapienza” University of Rome, Faculty of Law, Italy

Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, 2010, vol. 10, issue 3, 5-12

Abstract: This paper analyzes a rent seeking competition where risk neutral agents have a different income. The individual income is private information but the income distribution is common information. Like the Hillman and Samet (1987) model the individual outlays in rent seeking is equal to the expected rent, but the winning probability for each agent is a function of its income. As a consequence, the social costs of the rent seeking depend on the income distribution and they can be lesser than the traditional measure pointed out by Hillman and Samet (1987).

Keywords: rent-seeking; dissipation of rent; income distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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