Nonmarket Institutional Structures: Conjectures, Distribution, and Allocative Efficiency

Jon Cauley, Todd Sandler and Richard Cornes

Public Finance = Finances publiques, 1986, vol. 41, issue 2, 153-72

Abstract: This paper analyzes nonmarket institutional structure in which policymakers from two or more governments negotiate to commonly provide a pure public good or to internalize an externality. Various equilibrium notions for the linkage are examined, including Nash, non-Nash, and Pareto. The theoretical analysis indicates when distributional aspects can be separated from efficiency considerations for a nonmarket linkage. In addition, the authors demonstate that the likelihood of initial formation of such a linkage is related to the number of participants, the type of conjecture formed, and the mix between fixed and variable negotiation costs.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:41:y:1986:i:2:p:153-72

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