Market Vote Trading and Efficient Public Choice

Daniel P Hewitt

Public Finance = Finances publiques, 1987, vol. 42, issue 1, 85-104

Abstract: Market vote trading, where consumers directly substitute private goods for political influence, is examined to determine if this institutional modification can circumvent the vote paradox. The trading proves to have the potential to enhance the efficiency of democratic public choice for two reasons. It allows citizens to influence the vote outcome according to the intensity of their demands and citizen behavior in the market for votes provides information to government on demand for public services. The findings, which might have implications for the regulation of lobbies and PACs, are only valid when dealing with allocation decisions rather than distributional choices.

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:42:y:1987:i:1:p:85-104

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