Tax Evasion and Equity: A Theoretical Analysis

Josef Falkinger

Public Finance = Finances publiques, 1988, vol. 43, issue 3, 388-95

Abstract: This paper analyzes the behavior of an expected-utility maximizing tax evader who is aware of the fact that he gets some benefit in exchange for the taxes. Within this framework, the equity argument that the proportion by which a tax payer evades taxes decreases if the share in public expenditures that is for his benefit increases, cannot be confirmed unambiguously. There is, therefore, some theoretical support for the supposition that the equity argument is an ex post rationalization of otherwise motivated tax evasion.

Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:43:y:1988:i:3:p:388-95

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