Non-cooperative Behavior and Efficient Provision of Public Goods

Robin Boadway, Pierre Pestieau and David Wildasin

Public Finance = Finances publiques, 1989, vol. 44, issue 1, 1-7

Abstract: The authors show that, on the basis of a noncooperative equilibrium whereby pure public goods are financed by voluntary private contributions, a centralized agency may induce an efficient solution by an appropriate choice of subsidy on the individuals' contributions. They also show that a noncooperative equilibrium with positive contributions is efficient if, and only if, the individual per unit subsidies sum to n - 1, where n is the number of individuals. They finally establish a correspondence between noncooperative and Lindahl equilibria.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:44:y:1989:i:1:p:1-7

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