Political Entry Barriers and Tax Incidence: The Political Economy of Sales and Excise Taxes

G M Anderson, William Shughart and Robert Tollison

Public Finance = Finances publiques, 1989, vol. 44, issue 1, 8-18

Abstract: The authors' purpose is to examine certain institutional features of government that may facilitate the wealth transfer associated with the taxation of consumption. In particular, they argue that where entry barriers into politics are high, government will tend to rely more heavily on consumption taxes as revenue sources. This is because higher entry barriers make it more difficult for the interests of low-income taxpayers to get representation in the political process.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:44:y:1989:i:1:p:8-18

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